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Impact of First Birth Career Interruption on Earnings:  
Evidence from Administrative Data 
 
I. Introduction  
 A vast literature quantifies the labor market penalty associated with a worker who 
exhibits intermittent labor force attachment.  The penalty is typically measured in terms 
of lower wages accruing to workers who move frequently in and out, or who spend 
extended amounts of time out, of the labor market, relative to those with continuous labor 
market experience (for example, see Hotchkiss and Pitts 2005, 2007).1  An equally vast 
literature documents the important role that the presence of children plays in the labor 
supply decisions of women (e.g., Blau and Kahn 2007; and Cohany and Soc 2007) and 
what factors are important in women's labors supply decisions, specifically after giving 
birth (e.g., Joesch 1994; Klerman and Leibowitz 1994; Kenjo 2005; and Pronzato 2007).  
This paper marries these literatures by making use of some unique data sources to 
investigate the labor market consequences of labor supply decisions made by a woman at 
or shortly after the first birth of a child.      
 This paper makes four primary contributions to the literature.  First, the analysis 
exploits differences in pre-birth and post-birth employer characteristics to be able to 
control for individual fixed effects expected to affect the woman's decision to be 
intermittent.  In addition, the ability to be able to control for detailed employment 
characteristics is important as wages have been shown to vary significantly across firm 
and industry characteristics (for example, see Cardoso 2000; Gannon et al. 2005; and 
Hotchkiss et al., 2004).  The second contribution of the analysis is the uncovering of 
                                                
1 Also see Baum (2002), Jacobsen and Levin (1995), Stratton (1995), Sorenson (1993), and Mincer and 
Ofek (1982).  
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important variations across education level in both the penalty for intermittency and in 
the importance of accounting for endogeneity of the intermittency decision. The third 
primary contribution is the demonstration of the usefulness of using an index to capture 
multiple dimensions of a woman's intermittency experience; the index is less co-linear 
with other important wage determining characteristics, such as firm tenure, than each of 
its components individually.  Finally, this research provides evidence on the importance 
of the demand side characteristics when examining issues of labor force attachment.  
Indicators such as the rate of turnover in the industry and the health of the firm of 
employment significantly alter the penalty for intermittency attachment.  
 
II. Empirical Methodology  
 The analysis in this paper compares earnings of women with varying degrees of 
labor market intermittency in the sixth year after the birth of her first child.  Since the 
analysis is restricted to women who are working both before and six years after the birth, 
we have a relatively homogenous sample of women who are, at least, loosely attached to 
the labor market.2  The analysis makes use of a unique data set that combines vital 
statistics birth information with employment data.  Vital Statistics birth records 
containing information on women giving birth in the state of Georgia between 1994-2002 
are combined with matched employer-employee administrative data through 2008.  These 
data provide a census of working mothers in the state of Georgia in this time period.  
                                                
2 Since Kahn et al. (2014) find that selection into the labor market is most strongly influenced by children 
when women are young, we re-estimate the model on a sub-sample of older women (age ≥ 34) and find 
similar results to those reported here.  The wage penalty is larger, but varies similarly across education 
levels.  This suggests that generalizability is not severely compromised by focusing only on women 
attached to the labor market.  Results available upon request. 
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 A. The Earnings Equation 
 We assume that a woman's current (log) wages are determined as follows: 𝑙𝑛𝑊!,! = 𝛽! + 𝑋!,!! 𝛽! + 𝑋!!𝛽! + 𝛿𝐷!,!𝐼𝐿𝐹𝑃! + 𝜀!,!  (1) 
where 𝑙𝑛𝑊!,! is the log of a woman's real quarterly earnings, 𝑋!,! reflect current 
employment characteristics, such as characteristics of the woman's employer, her tenure 
with the employer, and various characteristics of the employer's industry; 𝑋! reflect 
demographic characteristics, such as education, age, race, and health of mother an child 
at the time of giving birth; 𝐷!,! is equal to one if the woman has a child in the current time 
period (rendering the intermittency decision relevant), zero otherwise; 𝐼𝐿𝐹𝑃! is the 
woman's intermittency experience during the five years after giving birth; and 𝜀!,! 
contains unobserved current random determinants of the wage, plus unobserved random 
components present at the time of giving birth.  In other words, 𝜀!,! = 𝑣! + 𝜉!,!.  Of 
course, there is every reason to expect that a woman's intermittency decision (𝐼𝐿𝐹𝑃!) will 
be correlated with random factors at the time of giving birth (𝑣!), rendering 𝐼𝐿𝐹𝑃! 
endogenous. 
 The timing of events in this model makes the standard instrumental variables (IV) 
approach infeasible.  The standard approach would require us to include future outcomes 
(employment characteristics six years after giving birth) in the estimation of the 
intermittency decision, which we believe fundamentally occurs at the time of, or shortly 
after, giving birth.  Alternatively, we transform the data by taking differences, which has 
the effect of sweeping away the fixed effect component of the error term.  Doing this also 
sweeps away all other time-invariant characteristics.  Since education, race, and health 
factors of the infant and the mother are observed only at the time of birth, any potential 
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influence of these characteristics on wage determination will be captured by the fixed 
effect.  The model will be estimated separately by education level to determine any 
variation in penalty along that characteristic. 𝐼𝐿𝐹𝑃! , ℎowever, remains as a regressor since 𝐷!,! is equal to one post-birth, but is equal to zero pre-birth, for all women.3  In addition, 
all of the employment characteristics (𝑋!,!) remain as the difference between post-birth 
and pre-birth employment characteristics.  The final estimating equation becomes: ∆𝑙𝑛𝑊!,! = ∆𝑋!,!! 𝛽! + 𝛿𝐼𝐿𝐹𝑃! + ∆𝜉!,! . (2) 
 Being able to interpret the results from this estimating strategy as causal depends 
on the endogeneity of a woman's intermittency decision being time invariant (swept away 
with differencing).  Since we are modeling the woman's intermittency decision as one 
that takes place at a single point in time (after having just given birth to her first child), 
satisfaction of this assumption is trivial.  As a robustness test, we do allow additional 
births in the intervening six year period to enter as a regressor (for a subset of the sample 
for which this information is available), with no appreciable effect on the results.  Any 
other characteristics of the woman that change over time are not available, and we 
believe, in any case, that there is a very strong fixed component to unobservables, such as 
health status and productivity.  It should also be noted that the results in this paper are, 
strictly, only generalizable to maternally-motivated spells of intermittency, although we 
haven't found any evidence that one "type" of intermittency should be expected to affect 
labor market outcomes differently than any other type of intermittency. 
 The employment characteristics included in the estimation include the woman's 
tenure with the employer; firm size; firm age; number of establishments the firm has; 
                                                
3 Of course, in six years it is possible that the woman has given birth to a second, or third, child.  We repeat 
the estimation on a reduced sample controlling for the number of siblings and obtain operationally 
equivalent results.  Results of this robustness analysis are detailed below. 
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whether the firm is new, dying, contracting, or expanding; and the degree of labor market 
competition in the firm's industry and county.  The model also contains several variables 
which measure labor demand factors that would be expected to affect the woman's 
individual earnings, such as the total employment in the industry, number of 
establishments in the industry, the level of turnover in the industry, and the average 
industry quarterly earnings.4   In addition, the quarter of observation is included to control 
for seasonal variation in observed wages and the seasonally adjusted quarterly 
unemployment rate is included to control for economic conditions.  Three digit NAICS 
industry fixed effects are also included -- these effects are identified by women who 
change industry of employment from pre- to post-birth, but are included to capture any 
industry specific determinants of wages that do not vary over time.  These regressors are 
all measured as the difference between the value six years after giving birth and its pre-
birth value. 
 B. Measuring Intermittency 
 An index of intermittency furing the five years after giving birth is constructed for 
each woman by combining the number of spells of absence from the labor force and the 
proportion of time spent absent from the labor force, which captures the average length of 
the spells of absence, weighted by the proportion of time in the labor force that was 
accrued since the last spell (this index was developed by Hotchkiss and Pitts 2005): 𝐼! = !!!! !!! 𝐿!"!!!!! !!, (3) 
where 𝑇! = the total amount of time between the birth and observed earnings for person i; 
                                                
4 Labor market competition is measured by a county/industry specific Hirfendahl-Hirschman Index 
(Hirschman 1964), which measures the degree of employment concentration (across firms) in the firm's 
industry and county.  The higher is the index the more concentrated is employment and, hence, less 
competition in the labor market.  
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 𝑛! = the number of spells of absence since birth for person i; 
 𝐿!" = the length of spell j for person i; and 
 𝜔! = the percent of work life accumulated since last spell of absence for person i. 
 
The number of spells (𝑛!) is scaled by the maximum number of periods observed in the 
data set between the birth year and year six (𝑁!); this ensures that each component of the 
index ranges between zero and one -- in this sample, the maximum number of spells 
observed is eight. Since we are using the earnings in year six after birth for each woman 
in the sample, the total amount of time since giving birth is the same for all observations, 
20 quarters.  As the number of spells and/or the length of a spell increases, the measure of 
intermittency increases.  As the time since the last intermittent spell increases, the 
measure of intermittency decreases.  Combining these factors allows the multi-
dimensional nature of intermittent behavior to be captured in a single measure, which is 
likely more reflective of the way employers view intermittent behavior in making hiring 
and pay decisions. In other words, it is the combination of factors rather than the distinct 
components that matters to employers.  In addition, whereas each of the components are 
highly co-linear with other wage-determining characteristics, such as firm tenure, the 
index is less so, allowing us to control for both the full nature of a woman's intermittency 
experience, plus other important employment factors.  The importance of this feature of 
the index will be illustrated below.   
 
III. Data  
 This paper utilizes Vital Statistics birth records from the State of Georgia for the 
period 1994 to 2002 linked with the Employer File and the Individual Wage File 
compiled by the Georgia Department of Labor for the purposes of administering the 
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state's Unemployment Insurance (UI) program.  All the data used in the analysis are 
highly confidential and strictly limited in their distribution.  
 Although the vital statistics birth records contain demographic information for the 
mother and father, including age, race, education, and marital status, as well as 
information on behavior during pregnancy, adverse outcomes, comorbid conditions, and 
complications associated with either the mother or the infant, all of this information is 
swept away with the fixed effect when the data are differenced.  However, these vital 
statistics data give us the observations essential for the analysis, namely the population of 
women giving birth between 1994 and 2002, and the important education indicator that 
will allow us to perform the analysis by education status. 
 The Employer File provides an almost complete census of firms in non-farm 
sectors, covering approximately 97 percent of non-farm workers, with records on all UI-
covered firms.  The establishment level information includes the number of employees, 
the total wage bill and the NAICS classification of each establishment.5  The Individual 
Wage File contains quarterly earnings information for all of those workers.6  Regrettably, 
this data set contains no information about the worker's demographics (e.g., education, 
gender, race, etc.), thus making it impossible to draw a control group of women not 
giving birth.  There is also no specific information about the worker's job (e.g., hours of 
work, weeks of work, or occupation).  The worker's earnings and employer information 
                                                
5 White et al. (1990) provide an extensive discussion about the use of these employment data, commonly 
referred to as the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), or ES-202 data. 
6 Included in earnings are pay for vacation and other paid leave, bonuses, stock options, tips, the cash value 
of meals and lodging, and in some states, contributions to deferred compensation plans (such as 401(k) 
plans).  Covered employer contributions for old-age, survivors, and disability insurance (OASDI), health 
insurance, unemployment insurance, workers' compensation, and private pension and welfare funds are not 
reported as wages. Employee contributions for the same purposes, however, as well as money withheld for 
income taxes, union dues, and so forth, are reported even though they are deducted from the worker's gross 
pay. 
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can be tracked over time and linked to the vital records data using an individual identifier.   
Because the UI Individual Wage file contains a firm rather than establishment 
identifier, a choice of which NAICS code to assign to each worker who was employed by 
a multi-establishment firm is required.  Following the Department of Labor convention, a 
6-digit NAICS code is assigned based on the largest share of the firm's total employment.  
The NAICS code for that industry is used to estimate industry dummy variables at the 
three-digit level.  Women working in the agricultural and mining industries are dropped 
due to poor coverage and industry size.  In addition, nominal quarterly earnings are 
converted to real values using the 2005 chain weighted PCE index. 
 A woman is included in the sample if she worked in any of the four quarters prior 
to the birth quarter (establishing her connectivity to the labor market) and worked in any 
of the quarters in the 6th year after the birth of her first child (providing a post-birth 
employment observation).  Pre-birth earnings are calculated as the highest quarterly 
earnings in four quarters preceding the birth quarter.  Current earnings are the highest 
earnings in any quarter in the 6th year after the year of birth.  Using yearly maximum 
earnings for current and pre-birth earnings minimizes any impact of pregnancy related 
illnesses (for pre-birth earnings) and seasonal factors (for both).    Other current job or 
employer characteristics relate to the employer/job in which the woman earned that 
highest pay.   
 A firm is considered to have just been born if there was employment in the last 
four quarters that was preceded by four quarters of zero employment.  A firm is 
considered to be dying if within the next year there is a quarter of zero employment 
followed by three quarters of zero employment.  A firm is considered to be contracting if 
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the employment in the current quarter is less than employment in that quarter in the 
previous year and vice versa for expanding. 
 Competition the firm faces in its industry/county is proxied for using a 
Hirfendahl-Hirschman Index (Hirschman 1964), which measures the degree of 
employment concentration (across firms) in the firm's industry and county.  The higher is 
the index the more concentrated is employment and, hence, less competition in the labor 
market.  Average firm turnover in the industry is measured by the share of employees in 
the industry who were not employed by the same employer in the previous year.    
 A. Data Limitations 
 While these administrative data are quite rich in many respects, allowing us to 
observe characteristics about the mother and her employer that have previously been 
unobserved, they do suffer some limitations.  First of all, the sample is limited to birth 
mothers who we are able to match to the Georgia Wage Files.  However, of the over 
460,000 women giving birth to their first child in this time period, 70 percent were 
matched to an employer in the year prior to the birth year.7 Also, employment is defined 
only based on whether a woman is observed to be employed in the state of Georgia by an 
employer covered by UI -- employment outside of the state of Georgia (or in uncovered 
employment) will not be observed, so if the woman returns, that absence will be counted 
as a spell of intermittency.  This also means that results are generalizable only to women 
in covered employment; this represents the vast majority of workers, however.  Finally, 
there are no measures of hours of work.  Quarterly earnings reflect both wages and hours, 
so if, for example, women with more intermittency are also more likely to work part-time, 
                                                
7 We have no way of knowing how much of the non-matched 30 percent is the result of imprecise matching 
or the result of the mother simply not being in the workforce. 
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then any measured penalty will be over-estimated when interpreted as a wage penalty.  
 B. The Sample 
 After excluding observations with missing data, the analysis is performed on 
191,125 women who were in the Georgia workforce prior to giving birth to their first 
child some time between 1994-2002 and were employed in the 6th year after the birth of 
the child.  Heeding warnings of Bollinger and Chandra (2005), we do not eliminate 
outliers, although doing so does not affect the results.   
 Sample means are presented in Table 1.  Overall, roughly two-thirds of the 
currently employed women have some absence from the work force during the five years 
after the birth of their first child.  Among these women with at least some intermittency, 
the average value of the intermittency index is 0.55, the average number of spells with no 
work is 2.4, the average percent of time since the birth of the child with no work is 32 
percent, and the average percent of the time since the birth of the first child that has 
occurred since the last spell of absence is 29 percent.  
[Table 1 about here] 
  On average, women with no intermittency spells earn roughly 16 percent more 
than women who have some measure of intermittency.  Women with some spell of 
intermittency tend to be slightly younger, are more likely to be black or Hispanic, are less 
likely to be married at the time of giving birth, and are likely to be less educated than 
women with no spell of intermittency.  In her job six years after giving birth, the average 
woman has just over one and a half years of tenure with her employer.  Of course, those 
with a spell of intermittency have much less tenure than those with no intermittency. 
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 Figure 1 provides an initial glimpse as to the expected relationship between 
current earnings and past labor market intermittency across educational attainment.  
Among all education groups, average quarterly earnings are lower at higher levels of 
intermittency.  However, it is not clear from the raw data that there is much difference in 
the relationship between intermittency and earnings across educational groups.  For 
example, the most dramatic drop in wages come at the highest values of intermittency, 
but is roughly the same percentage drop across all education groups. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
IV. Results 
 Table 2 contains results from both the OLS estimation, where the intermittency 
index is treated as exogenous, and the fixed-effects estimation.  The table also contains 
fixed-effects estimates from specifications where the intermittency index is replaced by 
each of its components, number of periods of absence, proportion of time out of the 
workforce, and percent of time since the last spell of absence. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 Focusing first on the OLS (exogenous) estimation results, we see that the 
woman's characteristics perform as expected in explaining her earnings six years after 
giving birth to her first child.  Earnings increase at a decreasing rate with age and 
increase with education.  Most of the employment characteristics have a similar 
relationship across the OLS and fixed effects estimation. Greater tenure with her 
employer increases a woman's earnings; women earn more at larger firms with fewer 
establishments; and women earn more in larger industries and in industries with greater 
 - 12 - 
average earnings.8  In addition, firm dynamics operate similarly across specifications, 
with the exception of contraction -- women at new and expanding firms have higher 
earnings than women not at expanding or new firms and women at dying firms earn less 
than firms not dying.9   
 In the OLS specification, women employed by firms in more competitive labor 
markets (lower HHI), earn more.  This relationship is reversed (and weakened) in the 
fixed-effects estimation, suggesting that there is some selection of higher earning women 
into more competitive labor markets.  The impact of the total number of establishments in 
the woman's industry also reverses, becoming negative in the fixed-effects estimation; 
this suggests that higher earning women select into firms with a greater number of 
establishments.  These selection effects, of course, disappear when the woman's fixed-
effect is swept away by differencing the data.  And, while a higher unemployment rate is 
associated with higher earnings in the OLS estimation, that relationship turns negative, as 
is more consistent with a piori expectations, in the fixed-effects estimation.  Working in a 
contracting firm, as mentioned above, also changes sign from positive to negative.  In 
addition, while working in an expanding firm maintains the same sign across 
specifications, the magnitude declines dramatically.  This suggests that individual 
characteristics are more highly correlated with whether a woman works in an expanding 
or contracting firm more than the whether she works in a new or dying firm.  
 Turning now to the intermittency penalty, the top row of Table 2 indicates that the 
assumption of exogenous intermittency leads to an over-estimate of the penalty for 
intermittency.  Based on the instrumented intermittency index, a woman experiences 
                                                
8 See Hotchkiss et al. (forthcoming) for the consistency with earlier wage determination literature. 
9 These results are consistent with Hotchkiss et al. (2004) who find that new employment with an 
expanding firm results in greater earnings gains than new employment with a contracting or dying firm. 
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roughly 18 percent lower earnings if she goes from zero intermittency to the sample 
average (for I>0) of 0.55.  However, assuming intermittency is exogenous suggests that 
an average level of intermittency reduces earnings by 51 percent.10  Estimates on each of 
the components illustrates how important the construction of an index that takes into 
account all dimensions of a woman's intermittency is.  Theoretically, more periods of 
absence, a greater proportion of time absent, and the shorter amount of time since her last 
spell should all work to reduce earnings.  Indeed, an increase of ten percentage points in 
the proportion of time spent out of the labor force lowers a woman's earnings by two and 
a half percent, and increasing the amount of time since the last spell of intermittency by 
ten percentage points increases a woman's earnings by nearly two percent.   
 Nonetheless, the results in Table 2 suggest that a greater number of periods of 
absence increases a woman's earnings.  As would be expected, however, each of these 
components is highly co-linear with a worker's tenure with her employer.  Re-estimating 
the model without tenure produces larger impacts of intermittency (and each of its 
components) and results in the expected negative impact of the number of periods.11  
Combining the components into an index allows us to account for all dimensions of a 
woman's intermittency as well as other important employment characteristics while 
mitigating any confounding influences of multi-collinearity.   
 These fixed-effects results are in the ballpark of estimates of the impact of labor 
market intermittency on earnings found by others (for example, see Mincer and Ofek 
                                                
10 Since the data do not contain information about hours worked earnings penalties estimated here combine 
any incidence of lower wages with lower hours.  This will only be a concern is women likely to exhibit 
greater intermittency are also more likely to work fewer hours.  Consequently, earnings estimates reported 
in this paper should be considered upper bound estimates of a wage penalty. 
11 Parameter estimates for the model excluding tenure are -0.4715, -0.0371, -0.4418, 0.3530 for the 
intermittency index, number of periods of absence, total percent of time absent, and percent of time since 
last spell, respectively.  All estimates are statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level. 
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1982; Sorensen 1993; Jacobsen and Levin 1995; and Hotchkiss and Pitts 2005).  For 
example, Shapiro and Mott (1994), who also looked at wages of women following the 
birth of their first child, find that women who return immediately to work experience a 
wage premium of roughly 19 percent.  In contrast, Spivey (2005) finds that after 
controlling for labor market experience, there is very little impact of additional measures 
of non-employment.  Here we see that not only does the amount of time absent (inverse 
of experience) matter but also the number of periods and the amount of time since last 
spell all contribute significantly, both collectively and separately, to the determination of 
a woman's earnings. 
 A. The Intermittency Penalty across Education Status 
 While many others have documented a significant negative relationship between a 
woman's education level and her level of labor market intermittency (for example, see 
Kenjoh 2005), Table 3 illustrates that the intermittency penalty also differs significantly 
across education status.  A woman with less than a high school education and an average 
(for her education cohort) amount of intermittency faces a penalty of 14 percent lower 
earnings compared to a woman with the same education with continuous employment 
after the birth of her first child.  By contrast, a woman with at least a college degree faces 
a penalty of 36 percent.   
[Table 3 about here] 
 Across all education levels, it is the low earning women who select into 
intermittency.  In other words, the unobserved component of a woman's wage 
determination (which is swept away as the fixed effect) is negatively correlated with her 
wage; when it is removed by differencing, the negative contribution of intermittency is 
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reduced.  In addition, it appears as though intermittency and unobserved characteristics 
are most negatively correlated at the lowest education levels.  Whereas in the model 
where intermittency is treated as exogenous there doesn't appear to be much difference in 
the contribution of intermittency to wage determination at different education levels (the 
coefficients are roughly the same), the penalty increases with education in the fixed 
effects model.12 
 B. Robustness 
A complication of this data set and timing of events in the analysis is that the 
women in the sample could have experienced a subsequent birth in the intervening time 
period between the birth of the first child and year six.  In addition, Troske and Voicu 
(2013) find that labor market outcomes vary by a woman's number of children.  While 
data limitations prevent the inclusion of sibling data for all years, for first births between 
1994-1996 it is possible to identify subsequent births that occur before year six. Thinking 
about the possibility of additional births in the intervening six years since a woman's first 
birth as a potential omitted variable, we re-estimated the model for this subset of years 
with and without an additional regressor indicating whether there were any additional 
births. In the wage equation, this regressor is equal to zero pre-first birth and equal to 
total number of children six years later.   
The coefficient on the number of children in the intervening years is statistically 
significant -- each additional birth reduces a woman's wage by roughly three percent.  
However, inclusion of this additional regressor leaves the estimated impact of 
intermittency on her wage unchanged. The parameter estimate (and std. err.) is -0.3342 
                                                
12 Results from Miller (2011) suggest that the timing of fertility decisions within one's career impacts the 
penalty and that the benefit of delaying fertility also varies by education level.  Other than controlling for 
age, we do not account for the specific timing of fertility decisions by education status. 
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(0.0136) excluding the number of children, and is -0.3333 (0.0136) including number of 
children as a regressor.13  Note that these estimates are also very close to that reported for 
the full sample of women in Table 2 (-0.3229).  All of the results across education levels 
are also robust to the inclusion of this additional regressor. 
 
V. Implications 
 This paper contributes to the understanding of the role labor market intermittency 
plays in the determination of women's wages.  We find that women with an average 
amount of intermittency during five years after the birth of her first child experience 
earnings that are roughly 18 percent lower than a woman with no intermittency.  We also 
show how useful the construction of an index to account for multiple dimension of 
intermittency is in order to isolate the effect of intermittency from other highly co-linear 
employment characteristics, such as tenure. 
 The importance of controlling for the endogeneity of the intermittency decision, 
which we do through a fixed-effects estimation procedure, is also demonstrated.  
Whereas the intermittency penalty appears to be similar across educational levels when 
treated exogenously (roughly 51 percent), the penalty increases with education in the 
fixed-effects estimation.  This difference is fairly dramatic with the penalty for those with 
a college degree being more than two times larger than the penalty for a woman with a 
high school degree.  Education does not insulate women from the penalties associated 
with intermittency, and, in fact, makes it even worse.  Of course, this likely has a lot to do 
with the fact women in the control group (those with no intermittency) at higher 
education levels earn significantly more than women in the lower-education control 
                                                
13 These estimation results are available upon request. 
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groups. 
 The ability of this analysis to control for the endogeneity of the women's 
intermittency decision is a direct result of observing these women in the labor market 
over an extended period of time, and having access to detailed information about the 
women's employers both before and after giving birth.  We believe that the quality and 
reliability of the estimates of the impact of intermittency on women's wages presented 
here derives directly from the ability to use administrative data and from not having to 
rely on survey responses or samples of the population. The data also illustrate how 
important firm and industry dynamics, such as whether a firm is expanding or contracting, 
or the degree of worker turnover in an industry, are in the determination of a woman's 
wage.  As such, these factors also likely play a role in a woman's assessment of the cost 
of her intermittency decisions. 
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Figure 1. 
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Table 1. Sample means (standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
Variable 
Full 
Sample 
Intermittency 
Index=0 
Intermittency 
Index>0 
Real quarterly earnings 8157.079 9035.324 7762.917 
 (4094.27) (3902.826) (4116.887) 
Intermittency Index .3819 0 .5533 
 (.3768)  (.333) 
Number of periods of absence 1.6849  2.4411 
 (1.3913)  (.979) 
Proportion of time spent out of the LM .2191  .3174 
 (.2563)  (.2529) 
Percent of time since last spell .5067  .2853 
 (.4034)  (.2784) 
Demographics at time of birth 
Age 24.8374 26.7555 23.9766 
 (5.6391) (5.4055) (5.5285) 
Black=1 .3578 .3264 .3718 
 (.4793) (.4689) (.4833) 
Hispanic=1 .0191 .0145 .0212 
 (.1369) (.1196) (.144) 
Less than HS=1 .1454 .0535 .1866 
 (.3525) (.225) (.3896) 
High school=1 .3499 .3137 .3662 
 (.477) (.464) (.4818) 
Some college=1 .2353 .2603 .2241 
 (.4242) (.4388) (.417) 
College or grad school=1 .2693 .3725 .223 
 (.4436) (.4835) (.4163) 
Married=1 .5824 .6972 .5309 
 (.4932) (.4595) (.499) 
Current employer characteristics (six years after birth) 
Tenure with employer 6.5668 14.3447 3.076 
 (9.0341) (11.7117) (4.1652) 
Employer Size (# wrkrs, 000) 3.0116 3.3423 2.8632 
 (7.2408) (7.0855) (7.3046) 
Employer # of establishments 3.0554 3.0374 3.0634 
 (7.6291) (7.4111) (7.7249) 
Employer birth=1 .0319 .0212 .0367 
 (.1757) (.1441) (.188) 
Employer death=1 .0013 .0007 .0016 
 (.0361) (.0263) (.0398) 
Employer contracting=1 .3539 .3667 .3481 
 (.4782) (.4819) (.4764) 
Employer expanding=1 .5592 .5589 .5594 
 (.4965) (.4965) (.4965) 
Employer age 44.7201 45.1111 44.5445 
 (19.4753) (16.6651) (20.61) 
Competition in industry/county .4925 .521 .4797 
 (.3606) (.3593) (.3604) 
Ind. total no. of establishments (000) 7.292 6.6222 7.5926 
 (7.6288) (7.4886) (7.672) 
Industry total employment (0000) 14.8744 13.9479 15.2902 
 (11.8774) (11.2954) (12.1066) 
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Variable 
Full 
Sample 
Intermittency 
Index=0 
Intermittency 
Index>0 
Average firm turnover in industry 80.5661 82.76 79.5814 
 (8.4651) (6.7713) (8.9505) 
Average industry quarterly earnings 9.6511 10.6936 9.1832 
 (4.4887) (4.3942) (4.4518) 
Unemployment rate (%) 4.6293 4.5137 4.6811 
 (.7039) (.5964) (.7412) 
Observations 191125 59206 131919 
Notes: Earnings are deflated by the 2005 chain weighted PCE.  Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 2. Estimation of log quarterly earnings in year six after birth of first child, treating intermittency as exogenous versus fixed-effects estimation. 
 Intermittency Index Components of Intermittency Index 
  
 
 
 
 
OLS 
Estimation 
(exogenous 
index) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fixed-effects 
estimation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of 
Periods of 
Absence 
Proportion 
of time 
out of 
Georgia 
Work Force 
Since 
Birth of 
First 
Child 
 
 
 
Percent of 
Time since 
last spell 
of 
Intermit-
tency 
Variables  𝑛!8 120 𝐿!"!!!!!
!!
 
 
 
(𝑛!) 120 𝐿!"
!!
!!!  
 
 
(𝜔!) 
      
Intermittency Index -0.9249*** -0.3229*** 0.0184*** -0.2539*** 0.1704*** 
 (0.0068) (0.0079) (0.0021) (0.0108) (0.0077) 
Tenure with employer 0.0067*** 0.0139*** 0.0216*** 0.0180*** 0.0163*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Employer Size (# wrkrs, 000) 0.0082*** 0.0055*** 0.0058*** 0.0057*** 0.0057*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Employer # of establishments -0.0011*** -0.0015*** -0.0013*** -0.0014*** -0.0014*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Employer birth=1 0.0603*** 0.0233* 0.0360*** 0.0282** 0.0247* 
 (0.0149) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0127) 
Employer death=1 -0.3290*** -0.3704*** -0.3323*** -0.3717*** -0.3544*** 
 (0.0563) (0.0266) (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0267) 
Employer contracting=1 0.0855*** -0.0104 0.0046 -0.0070 -0.0042 
 (0.0096) (0.0070) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0071) 
Employer expanding=1 0.1035*** 0.0126* 0.0243*** 0.0156** 0.0170** 
 (0.0094) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) 
Employer age 0.0003*** 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002* 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Competition in industry/county (HHI) -0.1149*** 0.0136* 0.0141* 0.0151** 0.0138* 
 (0.0073) (0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) 
Ind total number of establishments (000) 0.0039* -0.0070*** -0.0056*** -0.0063*** -0.0068*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Industry total employment (0000) 0.0192*** 0.0036*** 0.0022* 0.0030*** 0.0031*** 
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 Intermittency Index Components of Intermittency Index 
  
 
 
 
 
OLS 
Estimation 
(exogenous 
index) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fixed-effects 
estimation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of 
Periods of 
Absence 
Proportion 
of time 
out of 
Georgia 
Work Force 
Since 
Birth of 
First 
Child 
 
 
 
Percent of 
Time since 
last spell 
of 
Intermit-
tency 
Variables  𝑛!8 120 𝐿!"!!!!!
!!
 
 
 
(𝑛!) 120 𝐿!"
!!
!!!  
 
 
(𝜔!) 
 (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Average firm turnover in industry -0.0078*** -0.0085*** -0.0066*** -0.0078*** -0.0078*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Average industry quarterly earnings 0.0425*** 0.0099*** 0.0143*** 0.0117*** 0.0117*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Unemployment rate (%) 0.0138*** -0.0324*** -0.0388*** -0.0372*** -0.0344*** 
 (0.0036) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) 
Age -0.0026     
 (0.0035)     
Age squared 0.0003***     
 (0.0001)     
Black=1 -0.0274***     
 (0.0049)     
Hispanic=1 0.0837***     
 (0.0149)     
Less than HS=1 -0.1571***     
 (0.0069)     
Some college=1 0.1434***     
 (0.0056)     
College or grad school=1 0.5175***     
 (0.0065)     
Married=1 0.0657***     
 (0.0067)     
Father named=1 0.0374***     
 (0.0063)     
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 Intermittency Index Components of Intermittency Index 
  
 
 
 
 
OLS 
Estimation 
(exogenous 
index) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fixed-effects 
estimation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of 
Periods of 
Absence 
Proportion 
of time 
out of 
Georgia 
Work Force 
Since 
Birth of 
First 
Child 
 
 
 
Percent of 
Time since 
last spell 
of 
Intermit-
tency 
Variables  𝑛!8 120 𝐿!"!!!!!
!!
 
 
 
(𝑛!) 120 𝐿!"
!!
!!!  
 
 
(𝜔!) 
Constant 8.8398*** 0.5465*** 0.3165*** 0.4496*** 0.3087*** 
 (0.5112) (0.0097) (0.0100) (0.0094) (0.0089) 
      
Number of Observations 191,125 191,125 191,125 191,125 191,125 
R-squared 0.3831 0.1276 0.1205 0.1226 0.1223 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Regressions include a full set of three digit NAICS industry fixed effects 
and quarter fixed effects.  Industry/county competition is proxied by an industry/county specific Hirfendahl-Hirschman Index (Hirschman 1964), 
which measures the degree of employment concentration (across firms) in the firm's industry and county.  The higher is the index the more 
concentrated is employment and, hence, less competition in the labor market.  Earnings are deflated by the 2005 chain weighted PCE. 
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Table 3. Fixed-effects estimation of log quarterly earnings in year six after birth of first 
child, by education of the mother; OLS and fixed effects estimates. 
	  
Coeff.	  on	  Intermittency	  Index	  
(Std	  error)	   	  
	   Exogenous	   Fixed-­‐effects	  
Average	  
intermittency	  
index	  (if	  >0)	  
Full	  Sample	   -­‐0.9249***	   -­‐0.3229***	   0.5533	  
	  
(0.0068)	  
	  
(0.0079)	  
	  
(0.3330)	  
	  
Less	  than	  high	  school	   -­‐0.9852***	   -­‐0.2244***	   0.6451	  
	  
(0.0189)	  
	  
(0.0242)	  
	  
(0.3291)	  
	  
High	  school	   -­‐0.8638***	   -­‐0.2948***	   0.5493	  
	  
(0.0104)	  
	  
(0.0127)	  
	  
(0.3386)	  
	  
Some	  college	   -­‐0.8305***	   -­‐0.4074***	   0.5210	  
	  
(0.0134)	  
	  
(0.0158)	  
	  
(0.3290)	  
	  
College	  and	  graduate	  degree	   -­‐0.9787***	   -­‐0.7023***	   0.5152	  
	   (0.0149)	   (0.0155)	   (0.3162)	  
Notes: See notes to Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
